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Russian Intervention and the 
Independent Commonwealth of 
States 
Daniel McIntosh, University of Denver 
It is a rare event when a state ceases to exist while the elements 
which made it up endure. The fall of the Soviet Union, and the effort 
to build a new Commonwealth of Independent States out of its 
component republics and institutions, presents an opportunity to 
consider the role of local preferences and old state structures in setting 
rules for collective security and intervention. 
The concept of "intervention" has been stretched to cover a large set 
of dissimilar acts . Depending on context, intervention "appears to be 
synonymous with imperialism, aggression, colonialism, 
neocolonialism, war , and other such gross terms that are used to 
designate the noncooperative interactions of nations ."1 A more limited 
definition is required. In international law, intervention is "the 
dictatorial or coercive interference, by outside party or parties, in the 
sphere of jurisdiction of a sovereign state." 2 Operationally, two 
characteristics are necessary to distinguish intervention from other acts: 
it "constitutes a sharp break with the then-existing forms" of behavior 
and is "directed at changing or preserving the structure of political 
authority in the target society. "3 
The contest of conventions and authorities associated with 
intervention are clearly present in modem Eurasia. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union left in its wake a set of new independent states based on 
the Union Republics of the USSR, as well as the personnel and 
resources of the remaining "all-Union" institutions, most notably the 
Soviet Army. In the scrambel to divide the assets of the USSR- a 
process still under way- the Russian Federation emerged with the 
greatest share . Other nations with military expertise, in particular 
Ukraine, have been able to consolidate and gain the allegiance of troops 
on their soil. Still others, particularly in Central Asia, remain 
dependent on Russian military assistance to guard their borders. Deep 
structureal contradictions exist with both the CIS and its constituent 
1 James Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept," Journal of 
Co"[!_ict Resolution vol. 13 no. 2 (June 1969): 153. 
Hedley Bull, "Introduction," in Intervention in World Politics, ed . 
Hedley Bull (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1984): 1. 
3Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific Concept " (1969): 161. 
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states that have pulled security policy in several directions at once. 
How these contradictions are resolved will determine whether the CIS 
will exist as a cover for Russian nationalism, as a genuine alliance of 
sovereign states, or whether it will exist at all. 
For Russia, the fall of the USSR was the end of three centuries of 
empire. This legacy will not fade overnight Russia finds itself affected 
by disorder in the new neighboring states, and rising nationalism at 
home. Taken together, the Russian Federation has had a strong 
incentive to find new institutional mechanisms to share the cost of 
maintaining order in its perceived sphere, while avoiding any significant 
loss of control. 
The Commonwealth of Independent States grew out of that need. 
In the months following the coup of 1991, as Boris Yeltsin and 
Mikhail Gorbachev each worked to build a personal power base at the 
center, Yeltsin presented the CIS to the senior military leadership as a 
more viable alternative than a Union reborn. In those same months, 
the crisis at the center gave many of the old federal units the power and 
the inclination to tum formal sovereignty into true independence. As it 
developed, the struggle over the peacekeeping and collective security 
missions of the Commonwealth of Independent States traced the tension 
between the Russian goal of a relatively inexpensive means to remain 
the center of control, and the goal of other states (exemplified by 
Ukraine) to maintain their independence. In that struggle, the CIS has 
met the expectations of neither side. Neither the focus for Russian 
control nor the guarantor of local sovereignty, it has become a forum in 
which the tension between the center and periphery continues to play 
itself out. 
It is a tension that can be seen in the creation and implementation 
of doctrines for military intervention involving Russia and the 
Commonwealth. The Western standard of "peacekeeping" as expressed 
in the practice of the United Nations, is not shared in its entirety by 
either Russia or the CIS. Rules of engagement have authorized 
Russian troops to use much more force than one would find in a UN-
sponsored peacekeeping operation. Yet the official peacekeeping 
doctrine of the CIS, which consists of agreements between member 
states, is composed of broad statements that usually adhere to 
international standards. 
The first public comments on CIS peacekeeping forces were made 
by Marshal Shaposhnikov, as associate of Yeltsin, in February 1992. 
The doctrine of the CIS Joint Armed Forces (JAF) Staff, developed as 
interventions continued, listed that one mission of the CIS armed forces 
is "the prevention of conflicts and the maintenance of peace inside the 
Commonwealth," to be achieved by "utilizing collective peacekeeping 
forces and groups of military observers." Refusing to play favorites, 
the permanent CIS peacekeeping forces would act to "neutralize the 
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conflict detonators. "4 Yet from the start, the uncertain status of the 
CIS and the conflict between national and supranational aspirations 
have made implementation difficult. Questions about the legal validity 
of the CIS military oath, for example, prompted some units to delay 
taking it.5 
The March 1992 CIS summit in Kiev produced the first formal 
statement of peacekeeping doctrine, an agreement on "Groups of 
Military Observers and Collective Peacekeeping Forces in the CIS," 
signed by 10 of the 11 states then belonging to the Commonwealth. 6 
The agreement specified that a decision to use peacekeeping forces 
required a request made by all the sides in a conflict, and that forces 
could only be committed on the provision that an agreement between 
the parties "on the cessation of firing and other hostile actions" be made 
before the peacekeepers are sent. The agreement also called for forces to 
be assembled by voluntary agreement, with the exception of the sides 
involved in the conflict. No such forces have yet been assembled. 
In mid-May 1992, a draft agreement on CIS Joint Armed Forces 
was produced by Shaposhnikov and the CIS JAF Staff to construct a 
true supranational force in several stages. Mobile units capable of 
suppressing small border conflicts were to be formed by late 1994. 
Between 1995 and 1996 there was to be the formation of a true Joint 
Armed Forces, although with the subordination of the republics' armies 
to JAF command only in times of war . Russia rejected htis 
arrangement, arguing that it imposed a disproportionate share of the 
cost of the alliance on Russia while failing to put enough Russians in 
key positions of authority.7 
In May, as a means of circumventing some of the more 
independent members of the CIS, a "Treaty on Collective Security" was 
adopted by representatives of the Russian Federation, Tadjikistan, 
Uzbekistan, Krygyzstan, Kazakhstan and Armenia. 8 An ambiguous 
4Cited in Greene, "The Peacekeeping Doctrines of the CIS," (1993): 
158 . 
5For example see the appeal of a heavy bomber regiment based in 
Ukraine, "Hear Our Voice: We Want to Delay Taking the CIS Oath, " 
Narodnaya Armiya (16 January 1992), tran . JPRS -UMA -92-005 (20 
February 1992): 13-14. 
6Turkmenistan did not sign the agreement. Ukraine signed with the 
prov ision that its parliament would decide each case as it arose. Other 
memeber states were the Russian Federation, Belarus, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Armenia , Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and 
Kyrgyzstan. 
7 Arminas Norkus, "Generals' Games: Where Will Russia's Joint Armed 
Forces Impose Order?" Lietvos Aidas (29 June 1993), trans. FBIS-SOV-93-
134 (15 July 1993): 2. 
8
"Treaty on CIS Collective Security," RFEIRL Research Report vol. 2 
no. 25 (18 June 1993): 4-5. 
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declaration, Ukraine was unwilling to accept it as written. In parallel 
with the regional agreement, Russia formally established a Ministry of 
Defense and an independent Russian Army, matching a move by 
Ukraine at the first of the year. 
How were these acts to be reconciled with the call for a CIS 
supranational force? The Moscow summit of 6 July 1992 again called 
for joint forces to be assembled as soon as possible, but this was 
followed by a protocol at Tashkent on "Temporary Procedures for the 
Formation and Function of Military Peacekeeping Forces," signed by 
four Central Asian republics, Moldova, Armenia, and the Russian 
Federation. The protocol again emphasized that the decision to use 
peacekeeping forces would be made by consensus among the Council of 
CIS Heads of State and required each signatory to train forces for 
peacekeeping operations . At the same time it allowed peacekeepers to 
not only use force in self-defense, but also to separate hostile factions. 
At the summit of 25 September 1992 the seven signatory states of 
the CIS collective defense treaty agreed that, following a decision by 
individual states to participate in an action, operational command would 
be the responsibility of the CIS Joint Armed Forces command. Taken 
together, the JAF staff numbered about 300 officers and 400 persons, 
including 29 generals, 253 officers, 19 warrant officers, and 85 other 
employees. This was still in no way comparable to the hundreds of 
generals and several thousand officers in the former USSR Ministry of 
Defense, or even to the command element of the Belorussian Military 
District. 9 Since the problem of command (and training) ran directly 
into questions of sovereignty, no standing force has been created. When 
a force was sent to Tadjikistan a little more than a month later, it was 
organized on an ad hoc basis.10 
One year after the birth of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Main 
Command, there were more than 100 documents on the creation of 
unified forces, but no forces to command, and virtually no prospect that 
any forces would ever exist. 11 Shaposhnikov, Commander of the CIS 
Joint Armed Forces, lost that position in June 1993 when his post was 
abolished in a decision of the CIS Defense Ministers. 12 The 
implication, as one contemporary headline noted, was that "The CIS 
Joint Armed Forces Were Not and Will Not Be Created ." The CIS was 
9Viktor Litovkin , "The Joint Armed Forces Commissariat Keeps No 
Secrets from Us," lzvestiya (9 July 1992), trans . JPRS -UMA-92 -029 (5 
August 1992): 4. 
10Greene, "The Peacekeeping Doctrines of the CIS," (1993): 156. 
11 Dmitry Kholodov, "Presents for the High Command," M oscovskiy 
Komsomolets (7 July 1993), trans . FBIS-SOV-93-128 (7 July 1993): 1. 
12Andrey Naryshkin, "Decision to Reorganize Joint Armed Forces 
Command, " Moscow !TAR -TASS in English (24 August 1993), in FBIS-
SOV -93 -163. 
120 I The Journal of Political Science 
Russian Intervention and the CIS 
clearly not to become the institution visualized by Russia, and 
Shaposhnikov moved on to become secretary of the Russian Security 
Council. 13 On the fifteenth of June the Joint Military Command of the 
CIS was abolished, effective by the end of 1993.14 
In addition to the failure to create a true joint command, the 
doctrines of the CIS have been ignored or circumvented by Russian 
practice. 15 From the first, the fortunes of the Russian Ministrty of 
Defense rose as those of the CIS Joint staff declined. Nevertheless, 
there were also problems with creating a unified security policy in 
Russia. The peacekeeping and intervention doctrines of the Russian 
Federation were fragmented, held together by only the most general 
operational and political guidelines .16 To correct that fragmentation 
became the new priority, and in his new role as Secretary of the 
Russian Security Council, Marshal Shaposhnikov called for a 
"coordinating body ... that would base its decisions on a true picture of 
the state of affairs in security, and on a scientific approach to solving 
problems. " This he argued, could be achieved by a scientific research 
center under the Security Council. 17 
The science of military doctrine often had to take a back seat to 
more immediate issues. Shaposhnikov's call for clarity had little effect 
in a country divided by factionalism, ideology, and constitutional 
uncertainty . Moreover, the Russian military has had to deal with the 
collapse of empire. Russian troops continue to be withdrawn from the 
territories of the former USSR and Warsaw Pact. The Russian 
conscription system is marked by massive noncompliance. Weapons 
and training have suffered from a lack of support. In response to 
limited resources, the Russian Federation has moved to consolidate 
formal and informal ties to maintain influence in key strategic regions. 
When possible, the Russian Federation has used the CIS to provide 
an institutional framework . When it has not been possible to work 
through the CIS, Russia has found other ways to take action. When 
allied with other states' forces the Russian Federation has maintained 
the position of first among equals. Its officers still dominate the forces 
of the CIS. Its peacekeeping troops have been more professional than 
13Arminas Norkus, "Generals' Games: Where Will Russia's Joint Armed 
Forces Impose Order?" Lietvos Aidas (29 June 1993), trans. FBIS-SOV-93-
134 (15 June 1993): 2-3. 
14
"CIS Joint Command Abolished," RFEIRL Research Report vol. 2 no. 
25 (18 June 1993): 8. 
15Greene, "The Peacekeeping Doctrines of !he CIS," (1993) : 156. 
16Greene, "The Peacekeeping Doctrines of !he CIS," (1993): 156. 
17Moscow Mayak Radio Network (16 July 1993), trans . FBIS-SOV-93-
136 (19 July 1993): 27. 
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their allies, and the Russian Federation had maintained control over the 
joint commissions established to oversee peacekeeping operations.18 
The first two of these "peacekeepig" or "peacemaking" operations 
to involve Russian and other CIS forces began in mid 1992 in South 
Ossetia and Eastern Moldova. In each case, the intervention was 
structured and justified by a trilateral agreement between two warring 
parties and the Russian Federation. 19 The third intervention, beginning 
in early December 1992, was in Tadjikistan . In this case, the action 
was justified in terms of CIS collective security and peacekeeping 
agreements .20 Yet in each case the intervention has involved a 
predominantly Russian force, led by Russian officers. In the field, 
unable to wait for a final answer on military doctrine, those Russian 
forces have taken the lead in each region. Rather than a doctrine set 
from above, a set of general principles has emerged in action and has 
begun to be translated into formal rules. 
The first operational principle in all interventions by Russian 
troops has been a preparedness to use a high degree of force. In South 
Ossetia, for example, Russian troops were able to separate local parties, 
and announced they would open fire thirty minutes after the beginning 
of hostilities between those factions.21 In the words of Russia's formal 
military doctrine, set after the intervention has already taken place and 
based in part on the lessons drawn, the armed forces' mission is 
"operational containment of an area of tension and the termination of 
military operations at the earliest possible stage, in the interests of 
establishing preconditions for a settlement of conflict by peaceful 
means and on terms that are in keeping with Russian interests."22 
To better accomplish this task in the future, the Russian Ministry 
of Defense announced in September 1992 its reorganization of the 
military to include new mobile forces. These units, organized on the 
pattern of corps-brigade-battalion, rather than the larger armies and 
divisions of the past, are to be ready by 1995. The mobile forces, in 
tum, are divided into two components: the Immediate Reaction Forces 
(airborne troops, on constant alert to land in designated areas in less 
than 24 hours) and the Rapid Deployment Forces (requiring up to 72 
hours to come to full strength).23 A new "peacekeeping" division has 
18Greene, "The Peacekeeping Doctrines of the CIS," (1993): 157. 
19James M. Greene, "The Peacekeeping Doctrines of the CIS, " Jane's 
Intelligence Review (April 1993): 156. 
20Greene, "The Peacekeeping Doctrines of the CIS," (1993): 156. 
21Greene, "The Peacekeeping Doctrines of the CIS," (1993): 157. 
22Cite by Roman Zadunaisky, "Military Doctrin Adopted," Rossiiskiye 
Vesti (5 November 1993): 2, translated and reprinted in The Current Digest 
of the Post-Soviet Press vol XLV no. 44 (1993): 12. 
23 Interview with Yevgeniy Podkilzin by Dimitri Kholodov, "Hip 
Newspaper Congratulates Hip Troops," Moskovskiy Komsomolets (31 July 
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also been designated, with special training to deal with limited 
conflicts. 24 
The willingness to use force within the CIS has also been in 
keeping with Russia's calls to authorize greater force for United Nations 
peacekeepers. It has also been matched by Russian calls for outside 
funding of its peacekeeping operations. Russia's proposals to the UN 
have also shown some insensitivity to the political ramification of 
using Russian troops to police the territories of the former USSR. 
When approached with a request for UN funding, Secretary-General 
Boutrous-Ghali suggested that Russian peacekeepers work outside of the 
former USSR and troops from overseas be sent to the states on the 
periphery, but the idea was rejected by Russia as uneconomic and 
unrealistic .. "Why go to unnecessary expense," one Russian diplomat 
asked, "when our troops are already present there and are prepared to 
operate under the UN Flag?"25 
The second operational principle has been to maintain an 
appearance of neutrality. 26 In practice this has proven more difficult 
than expected . States of the former Soviet periphery are wary of 
Russian promises. In addition, the actions of Russian troops, whether 
by protecting the enclave of the "Dneister Republic" or the border of 
Tadjikistan, have immediate ramifications for the local balance of 
power. Finally, while the constitution of the Russian Federation 
recognizes the "generally recognized principles of the equality and self-
determiniation of peoples" it also "guarantees its citizens protection 
beyond its borders. "27 Considering the millions of Russians outside 
the borders of the Russian Federation, this guarantee can justify a wide 
range of interventions into the other states of the former USSR, and 
contribute to tension for its neighbors.28 
1993 ): 1, translated and reprinted in FBIS-SOV -03-146 (2 August 1993 ): 
31; Richard Woff, "Russian Mobile Forces 1993-95" Janes Intelligence 
Review (March 1993): 118. 
24John W. R. Lepingwell, "Restructuring the Russian Military," RFE!RL 
Research Report vol. 2 no. 25 (18 June 1993 ): 20. 
25Maksim Yusin, "Who Will Finance Peacekeeping Operations in the 
CIS?" lzvestiya (29 October 1993): 3, translated and reprinted in The 
Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press vol. XLV no. 43 (1993): 25. 
26Greene, "The Peacekeeping Doctrines of the CIS," (1993): 157. 
27Constitution of the Russian Federation, Izvestia (10 November 1993), 
reprinted in The Current Digest of the Post -Soviet Press vol XLV no. 45 
(1993) : 4, 7. The noninterference pledge is also found in "Basic 
Provisions of the Russian Federation's Military Doctrine," Izvestia, 
excerpted and translated in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press vol. 
XLV no . 46 (1993): 11. 
28See comments by Lt. General Ivashov on Russia's responsibility to 
lead and to protect Russians abroad in Vyacheslav Kocherov, "We Are 
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Decisions to intervene have been justified in terms of the Russian 
national interest. This is usually defined to include protection for 
significant Russian minorities found outside of the Russian Federation, 
but even here there can be disagreements about what constitutes a 
significant minority or a significan threat, and in a time of uncertainty 
there is an appeal to definitions that neglect the interests of others. The 
director of the CIS Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, for 
example, wrote in mid-1992 that "[w]ithin the framework of the CIS, 
Russia is de jure and de facto called upon to play a special role in the 
entire geopolitical space of the USSR." In particular, "Russia should 
say openly tha it is opposed to the formation of any closed military-
political alliances whatsoever by the former Union republics, either 
with one another or with third countries that have an anti-Russian 
orientation. And that it will regard any steps in this direction as 
unfriendly." 29 At the same time, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet's 
Joint Committee on International Affairs and Foreign Economic 
Relations recommended 
"As the internationally recongnized legal 
successor to the USSR, the Russian Federation 
should base its foreign policy on a doctrine declaring 
the entire geopolitical space of the former Union to 
be the sphere of its vital interests (like the US's 
Monroe Doctrine in Latin America) and should strive 
to achieve from the world community recognition of 
its role as political and military guarantor of stability 
in the entire former space of the USSR. It should 
strive to achieve support from the Group of Seven 
countries for these functions of Russia's up to and 
including foreign-currency subsidies for quick reaction 
forces (Russian "blue helmets").30 
When formalized, Russian military doctrine added this new 
peacekeeping mission to the tasks of deterring and repulsing 
Strong When We Are Together," Rossiyskaya Gazeta (21 August 1993), 
trans . FBIS -SOV-93-162 (24 August 1993): 4. 
29 Professor Andranik Migranyan, "Real and Illusory Guidelines in 
Foreign Policy," Rossiyskaya Gazeta (4 august 1992): 7, translated and 
reprinted in The CurrenJ Digest of the Post-Soviet Press vol. XLIV no. 32 (9 
September 1992): 1. 
3
°From a document "Recommendations," cited by Konstantin Eggert, 
Izvestia (7 August 1992): 6, translated and reprinted in The CurrenJ Digest 
of the Post-Soviet Press (9 September 1992): 5. 
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aggression. 31 In doctrine and in practice, Russian forces have been 
committed to defuse or contain ethnic conflicts with a regional 
dimension, always with an eye to preserving the rights of Russians and 
the Russian Federation. The Russian draft military doctrine also 
inclues as a "special mission" the protection of the "rights and interests 
of Russian citizens abroad, connected with it ethnically and culturally." 
In Moldova, for example, this had meant support by the 14th Army for 
the Russian minority. Deployment was authorized by the Supreme 
Soviet, in part, to shield the gains made by that minority from 
Moldovan couterattacks. 32 On the other hand in its early stages Russia 
refused to intervene in Nagomo-Karabakh, despite the fact Armenia 
invoked the CIS collective security treaty and without a meeting of CIS 
leaders to discuss the option. There weren't enough Russian lives at 
risk. 
In Tadjikistan, the large Uzbek population threatened to draw 
Uzbekistan into an ongoing civil war. Beginning in March 1992, in 
excess of 20,000 had died in Tadjikistan in the first year of that war, and 
nearly a million fled their homes. To prevent greater losses-and to 
contribute to Russian interests-CIS troops from the 201st Motor 
Rifle Division, based in Dushanbe, intervened. But they found 
intervention more difficult than expected. The 201st declared that it was 
neutral, but came to be seen as acting on behalf of the local 
government. Locally-born conscripts deserted, and armored vehicles 
were stolen from bases. The officers, at that time 90 percent Russian, 
found themselves giving their primary attention to protecting their 
families, the Russian-speaking population, and the remaining assets of 
the division. CIS peacekeeping forces could not be arranged, due to 
vetoes of the plan by the parliaments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
Yet the presidents of those new states agreed to reinforce the border 
guards, while the Russian Ministry of Defense moved to reinforce the 
201st MRD with new troops from Russia . In the long run, The 
Defense Ministry has announced the division will be the first in the 
Russian Army to be manned entirely by troops on contract. 33 
Third, Russia has used the opportunity to deploy peacekeepers to 
apply pressure and to reinforce Russian forces near former Soviet 
borders. The best example of this is the intervention in Moldova. 
There, a Russian army is based on Moldavan territory without a basis 
in international law, backing an insurgency by local Russian 
communists that holds power on the east bank of the river Dniester. 
31 Viktor Lovkin, commentary, Izvestia (4 November 1993), translated 
and reprinted in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press vol. XLV no . 
44 (1993) : 11. 
32Greene, "The Peacekeeping Doctrines of the CIS," (1993): 157. 
33 Michael Orr, "The Civil War in Tadjikistan," Jane's Intelligence 
Review (April 1993): 181-184. 
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The Fourteenth Army was already based in Moldova before the collapse 
of the USSR, and had a history of opposing the independence and army 
of the new Moldova. Today it is slowly being absorbed into-and 
taking over-the Republican Guard of the "Dniester Republic." 34 
Meanwhile, the Dniester Republic has taken over the resupply of the 
Fourteenth Army, with the assistance of subsidies to the insurgents 
from Russia. 35 The role of the CIS in the intervention is compounded 
by the presence of a "peacemaking contingent" under the auspices of the 
Commonwealth, deployed in. Moldova in August 1992 at the "request" 
of a Moldavan government looking to disengage from combat with the 
Fourteenth Army. 36 In practice it has served to do little more than 
observe and justify the actions of the Fourteenth Army. 
Deployment in Moldova serves to pressure Ukraine on a second 
front, and raises the issue of transit rights across Ukrainian territory. 
Ukrainian president Kravchuk has rejected "all attempts to turn back the 
wheel of history and revive the old imperial center," nor would Ukraine 
agree "to be subordinated to centralized CIS structures."37 Hawver the 
Russian forces are already there. There is no indication they will depart 
any time soon. By their presence, Russia maintains a tacit threat not 
only to Moldova but to Ukraine. Paradoxically, Russian military 
doctrine lists among the factors that would indicate "an immediate 
military danger to the Russian Federation," the "introduction of foreign 
troops to the territory or states contiguous to the Russian Federation," 
unless this is associated with the UN Security Council or a regional 
body that has the consent of Russia. 38 There is no recognition that 
Russia's neighbors might be justified in having a similar concern. 
The interventions already under way show that there are grounds for 
concern. In Tadjikistan, Russina troops hold to a formal policy of 
neutrality that defends the government in power. In Ossetia, Russian 
troops have shown a willingness to use a high degree of force in order 
to clamp a lid on the ethnic tensions of a region dear to Russia's 
interests. In Moldova, the most blatant violation of international law 
and CIS declarations, Russian troops are growing more and more 
indistinguishable from the official army of the "Dniester Republic." 
What is at issue are the rules which will structure relation between 
the Eurasian states . Depending on the rules that emerge at this 
34Vladimir Socor, "Russia's Army in Moldova : There to Stay?" RFEIRL 
Research Report vol. 2 no. 25 (18 June 1993): 42-43, 45. 
35Socor, "Russia's Army in Moldova: There to Stay?" (1993): 45. 
36Socor, "Russia's Army in Moldova : There to Stay?" (1993): 43, 45. 
37 Cited by Roam Solchanyk, "Ukraine and the CIS : A Troubled 
Relationship," RFEIRL Research Report vol. 2 no. 7 (February 1993): 10. 
38
"Basic Provisions of the Russian Federation's Military Doctrine," 
Izvestia, excerpts translated and reprinted in The Current Digest of the Post-
Soviet Press vol XLV no. 46 (1993): 12. 
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formative period, the CIS has the potential to be an institution for 
international law and local rights, or a cover for the domination of the 
weak by the strong. The way in which the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, and Russia's role in the CIS, has been perceived in 
the world community has been a factor which may influence the 
direction the CIS will take. The United Nations, by calling for a 
Russian involvement in peacekeeping that more closely adheres to UN 
guidelines, sets a higher standard for future action. 
The standard set by the United States has been less clear. The US 
and the Russian Federation have agreed to undertake joint peacekeeping 
exercises, with the 27th Motor Rifle division of the Volga Military 
District and the US Third Infantry Division designated to participate. 39 
Care must be taken if the US is to avoid the implication that it accepts 
special rights for Russia in Eurasia, based solely on the legacy of the 
Russian empire and the USSR. 
In response to limited resources, the Russian Federation has moved 
to consolidate formal and informal ties to maintain influence in key 
strategic regions. Operations in Moldova and Tadjikistan suggest one 
goal may be to create new "Kaliningrads" on or near the former borders 
of the USSR. At the end of 1993 Russia warned of "something other 
than persuasion" if offensives in Nagomo-Karabakh and Azerbaijan were 
not ended. 40 The issues raised in the interventions of the post-Soviet 
era refuse to disappear, and the contradictions of the CIS have yet to be 
fully resolved. Russia cannot help but have a special role in the region: 
geography, economic interdependence and the balance of forces make it 
necessary. But the suggestion that Russia has rights beyond those due 
to any other state under international law must be resisted if the CIS 
will ever be a true peacekeeping institution. 
39Barbara Starr, "Russia, USA to Train for Peacekeeping," Jane's 
Defense Weekly (19 June 1993): I. 
40 Paul Beaver, "Flash Points," Jane's Defense Weekly (11 December 
1993): 17. 
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